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Abstract
We study absolute income poverty measurement when agents differ
in preferences and face different prices. The difficulty arising from
price heterogeneity is typically solved using equivalent income, but
the choice of the reference price vector remains arbitrary. We provide
a way to solve this arbitrariness problem by making the poverty mea-
sure consistent with preferences: an agent qualifies as poor if and only
if she prefers the poverty line bundle to her current consumption bun-
dle. We then prove that defining group/region specific poverty lines is
another way of recovering consistency with preferences, provided one
uses the headcount ratio. Comparing the resulting three approaches
using Indian data, we find that the different approaches leads to dif-
ferent poverty conclusions. We show that not taking preferences into
account leads to severely underestimating urban poverty.
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1 Introduction
Measuring poverty is a key component of the evaluation of policies aiming at
improving the well-being of the worse off in society. How to measure poverty,
however, has been under debate over many decades.
The theory of poverty measurement was pioneered by Sen (1976). In the
classical framework, an economy is a set of agents who are each character-
ized by their income level. An agent is said to be poor if her income falls
below some exogenous income threshold, the income poverty line. An income
poverty index is a real-valued function defined over the vector of individual
incomes, which is insensitive to changes in incomes above the income poverty
line. Several desirable properties have been studied and families of poverty
indices, such as the class of Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke poverty indices
(Foster et al., 1984), have been shown to satisfy them (see, for instance,
Foster and Shorrocks (1991), and Ebert and Moyes (1991)). The popular
headcount ratio and the poverty gap are examples of such poverty indices
(for a survey, see Zheng (1997)).
Measuring income poverty in a country with varying prices across regions
requires a comparison of incomes giving rise to different budgets, that is
different opportunities to buy goods. In general, this implies to (explicitly
or implicitly) choose a poverty line bundle, the same for all individuals, and
to define region-specific poverty line incomes as the incomes that are needed
to afford this bundle given the prices in the region. We show below that the
current way of determining regional poverty line incomes in India corresponds
to this methodology. That creates two problems.
The first problem is that people who like a good quite a lot and live in a
region in which this good is relatively cheap may be better-off than people
having exactly the same preferences, a larger income, but living in a region
in which this good is relatively expensive. To put it differently, we don’t have
a monotonic relationship between incomes and well-being: an individual can
be at the same time poorer in income but better-off than another individual
who has the same preferences but lives in another region and faces different
prices (see, for instance, Roberts (1980)).1
1The problem is even worse if the objective is to measure global poverty or to make
comparisons across countries. Indeed, differential evolutions of the value of currency units
A solution to this problem came soon after Sen’s contribution. Incomes have
to be adjusted to become price insensitive. This adjustment, initiated by
Samuelson and Swamy (1974), is done as follows. One and only one refer-
ence price vector is defined. Then, for each individual, an equivalent income
is computed, having the property that each consumer is indifferent between
facing actual prices with her actual income or facing the reference prices
with that equivalent income. The immediate consequence of this correction
is that expenditure functions have to be estimated, making the exercise of
measuring poverty much more difficult (and demanding on the data). An-
other consequence is that a new problem arises: how to choose the reference
price vector? In the absence of a clear theory of how to do it, this choice
remains arbitrary (for a complete review, see Fleurbaey (2009)).
The second problem is that income poverty so defined is inconsistent with
poverty defined in terms of satisfaction of the preferences in the following
sense: an individual may qualify as poor and at the same time strictly prefer
her actual bundle to the poverty line bundle. This inconsistency could imply
that alleviating poverty becomes a fight of which poor people themselves
disapprove.
In this paper, we propose a solution to this second problem that also solves
the arbitrariness difficulty associated with the equivalent income solution
to the first problem. Then, we relax the assumption of a common poverty
line bundle and explore whether defining group-specific poverty line bundles
could also solve the two problems. Our main result is that the answer is
yes, provided poverty line bundles are appropriately chosen, provided they
are not only group but also region-specific, and, finally, provided the poverty
index that is used to aggregate incomes is the headcount ratio. We draw
the conclusion that there are three possible approaches to measure income
poverty, and we test these on four socio-demographic groups (urban/rural
and young/old household head) using Indian data. Our poverty bundle con-
sists of cereals, vegetables, clothing, and fuel. Using the headcount index and
TIP curves, we find that taking preferences into account leads to different
poverty conclusions than the other two approaches. In particular, not tak-
ing preferences into account leads to severely underestimating urban poverty,
typically affects the relative prices of tradable goods versus non-tradable ones, which
raises the difficult question of the measurement of purchasing power parities (PPP). For
a detailed presentation of this question and a proposed solution, see World Bank Report
(2016).
indicating that their preferences over the poverty bundle matters. Addition-
ally, the ordering of the TIP curves of the socio-demographic groups change
partially using our approach.
A key aspect of our study in this paper is that we find it desirable to measure
poverty in such a way that an increase in preference satisfaction should never
go together with an increase in poverty. However, taking preferences into ac-
count when measuring poverty may look questionable. First, there may be a
philosophical stance that individual choices are irrelevant to the definition of
well-being. A part of the poverty measurement literature is consistent with
this stance (mostly the counting approach developed mainly by Alkire and
Foster (2011a,b); Alkire et al. (2015)), which nonetheless, contradicts the
classical position of normative economics, embedded in the Pareto principle.
Without denying the merits of the counting approach, especially when avail-
able data does not allow us to estimate preferences or when time and space
price variations make it hard to compare incomes, we choose to embrace the
classical position here, without new argument for it. What is underlying our
position is that tastes and needs jointly determine what is good to a person.
Tastes and needs are revealed by choices. There is good reason, therefore, to
believe that if an individual chooses one basket of goods over another one,
the well-being of this person is higher with the former basket. Let us add
that small individual mistakes or departure from rationality are absorbed in
the error term of the econometric estimations. Moreover, these estimations
combine the reactions to prices of people above and below the poverty line,
to give an average behavior. As will become clear below, what is key for our
application will be the estimation of preferences around the poverty line.
The demand of some types of goods, though, is not commanded by the search
for a higher welfare. This is the obvious case of temptation (or sin) goods,
such as tobacco and alcohol. Ideally, we should, therefore, find the way to
estimate what would be the preference satisfaction of each individual, should
s/he have a zero demand of these goods. In this paper, we do not enter the
difficult methodological questions that such an estimation raises. We would
like to note, though, that the groups that we find systematically underrepre-
sented in the poor population when we take preferences into account do not
have the largest consumption of temptation goods. Our conclusions, then,
would only be reinforced if we were to take temptation goods into account.
Some may argue that choices could be a reason why people fall into or stay in
poverty, rendering them not normatively compelling. We disagree with this
argument, though, because we interpret recent contributions about choices of
the poor as questioning their seeming lack of rationality. The general impres-
sion from Banerjee and Duflo (2012, 2007), for instance, is that choices and
behavior that look like mistakes at first glance turn out to be rational when
the constraints facing agents are clearly identified. Carvalho et al. (2016)
recently showed that even the seemingly present bias of poor people may ac-
tually be a rational response to liquidity constraints. This kind of evidence
supports the assumption that poor people themselves know the constraints
they are facing much better than the analyst (or the policy maker) and their
choices deserve to be respected. By far the main constraint that they face
is the imperfection of capital markets. Given that liquidity constraints do
not affect the way people spend their money among the four goods we will
be interested in in our application, our results are not affected by these con-
straints.
Taking preferences into account as we do in this paper turns out to have an
interesting normative consequence. The satisfaction level that one needs to
reach to escape poverty no longer depends on the region where s/he lives.
This amounts to claim that individuals should be compensated for external
characteristics (that is the prices) of the region in which they live (for an
extensive introduction to the ethics of compensation, see Fleurbaey (2008)).
Applying this kind of regional compensation principle to poverty measure-
ment, however, raises the following question: why do people live in regions
in which prices are detrimental to their satisfaction, in the sense that other
regional price vectors would allow them, given their income, to reach higher
satisfaction levels. To put it differently, if individuals are free to move and
if they choose to live in a sub-optimal region, should we not hold them re-
sponsible for their location instead of compensating them for the prices they
face? The reason why we believe that taking individuals responsible for their
location is not normatively appealing is that regional price differences are
certainly not the main reason why individuals choose where to live. Their
ability to earn income, for instance, certainly depends on the region where
they live either because they own a plot of land or because of regional specific
human capital or imperfections in the labor market. As a result, we believe
that compensating for the price vectors individuals face is the relevant nor-
mative principle and taking preferences the way we do is a way to satisfy
it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the way the region-specific poverty line incomes are currently determined in
India. In Section 3, we present the model and the classical approach of price
sensitive poverty measurement. We formalize the first problem mentioned
above by proving that the classical approach fails to respect preferences. In
Section 3, we present the equivalent income approach, and we show that it
fails to solve the second problem, that is, any poverty measure in this family
fails to satisfy a property of consistency with preference poverty. We then
present our correction of the equivalent income approach that satisfies this
property, and, at the same time, solves the arbitrariness problem of the choice
of the reference price vector. In Section 5, we prove that defining group and
region-specific poverty line bundles is another way of respecting preferences
and satisfying consistency with preference poverty. In Section 6, we describe
the data. In Section 7, we show how we estimate preferences. In Section 8,
we compare the three approaches of income poverty measurement. In Section
9, we give some concluding comments.
2 Fixing the poverty line: The Indian context
In this section, we detail the official Indian poverty measurement methodol-
ogy. India has a rich history of academic and policy work on poverty mea-
surement that is both nationally and globally relevant (for a good discussion
see Deaton and Kozel (2005)). Since the first official recommendation in 1962
on fixing the poverty line, there have been several improvements, though the
poverty line dependence on a calorie intake has been a constant feature (see
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) for more details). Additionally, the large re-
gional price variation across India is a well documented fact and the poverty
measurement methodology tries to address this.2 The current methodology
is the one proposed by the Rangarajan (2014) expert group (Rangarajan et
al., 2014), which fixes the poverty line as an all-India poverty line bundle
valued in monetary terms covering both food and non-food dimensions.
The methodology entails the following steps - first, it establishes the all-India
average requirements of calories, proteins and fats based on official nutritional
2Deaton and Dupriez (2011) document this variation. The same is reflected in the data
we use as shown in Figure 7.
norms. Then a food basket that simultaneously meets all these normative
requirements is defined as the food component of the poverty line bundle.
This is implemented by finding the quantile of the income distribution that
meets these nutrient norms and using their average monthly per capita con-
sumption expenditure on food as the food component of the poverty line.
Note that in principle the methodology is fixing on a consumption bundle
that meets certain norms. For the non-food dimensions, they propose to use
the median values of clothing expenses, rent and education expenses as the
normative requirement. For all the remaining non-food dimensions the ex-
penses of the quantile that meets the nutrient norms are added to the poverty
line. This gives two poverty line bundles, urban and rural, and the monetary
value of this basket gives the national rural and national urban poverty lines.
Finally state-specific (i.e., region-specific) poverty line incomes are derived
as the income that is needed to afford this bundle given the prices in the
region.
As discussed in the Introduction, such an approach leads to two problems,
which we address in this paper. Additionally we explore the possibility of
region-specific poverty bundles instead of the common national bundle. This
is one of the issues being discussed with regard to the current methodology as
consumption preferences vary across India along different dimensions. Atkin
(2013), for instance, finds huge regional differences in food consumption in
India. The current methodology has been criticized for ignoring this large
variation in dietary and consumption preferences across India by using an all-
India bundle. Ray and Sinha (2014) suggest that - It would have been more
realistic to follow this procedure for each state and region (urban, rural) and
fix the poverty line state-wise rather than derive the state poverty lines from
the cost of buying the all-India basket of items. In turn, this is acknowledged
by the members of the committee in their clarification response (Rangarajan
and Dev, 2014) by stating that the need for separate poverty lines based on
variation in consumption of different states has been an issue long known
to the various expert committees but remains unsolved. In this paper, we
construct the poverty line and prices in a similar way to the official Indian
methodology.
3 The model and the classical approach
Following the discussion above, we begin by defining a measure of income
poverty, in a way that will allow us to discuss different ingredients we are
interested in, that is price heterogeneity and variable poverty line bundles.
There is a non-empty and finite set N ⊂ N of agents. There are ` private
goods. Each agent’s consumption set is X = R`+. For agent i ∈ N , we let
xi ∈ X denote agent i’s consumption bundle, pi ∈ ∆`−1 denote the price
vector facing i (and ∆`−1 denotes the `−1 dimensional simplex), and ui ∈ U
denote a utility function representing i’s preferences. We let U denote the
set of utility functions representing preferences that are differentiable on the
interior of X, monotonic3 (that is, for two bundles xi, x′i ∈ R`+, if xi ≤ x′i,
then ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi), and if xi  x′i, then ui(x′i) > ui(xi)), and convex.
The (economic) situation of agent i ∈ N is a triple si = (xi, pi, ui) ∈ X ×
∆`−1 × U . We further restrict our attention to bundles that are equilibrium
bundles given the prices, that is, situation si = (xi, pi, ui) is a valid situation
if and only if xi is the demand bundle of agent i given the prices she faces,
that is,
xi = arg max
pix≤pixi
ui(x). (1)
Let Si denote the set of possible individual situations of agent i ∈ N . An
economy is a list of individual situations, one per agent, s = (si|i∈N) ∈ S =∏
i∈N Si.
Measuring poverty requires to define three functions. An income construc-
tion function Y : S → RN+ transforms individual situations into comparable
incomes. An income poverty line function y : S → RN+ transforms individ-
ual situations into an income threshold below which the agent is poor and
above which the agent is non-poor. Finally, An income poverty index is a
function Π : RN+ → R that satisfies the following properties: there exists an
income threshold, which we normalize to 1, such that income changes above
that threshold do not affect poverty, poverty strictly decreases if an agent’s
income increases from below to above the threshold, and income poverty
does not increase if the income of a poor agent increases. Formally, for all
3The three vector inequalities are denoted ≤, < and  .
y = (yi|i∈N) , y′ = (y′i|i∈N) ∈ RN+ , for all j ∈ N , if yi = y′i for all i 6= j, then
1 ≤ yj < y′j ⇒ Π(y) = Π(y′) (2)
yj < 1 < y
′
j ⇒ Π(y) > Π(y′) (3)
yj < y
′
j < 1 ⇒ Π(y) ≥ Π(y′). (4)
The best-known income poverty indices are the headcount ratio and the
poverty gap ratio. The headcount ratio simply computes the fraction of the
population N who has an income below the line. The poverty gap ratio
measures the total amount of income that would be necessary to move all
poor agents out of poverty, as a fraction of the total amount of money that
is sufficient to have all agents in the population above the line. They both
belong to the Foster-Greer-Thorsbeek (FGT) family of indices, defined by
Π(y) =
1
N
∑
i ∈ N
yi < 1

(1− yi)α
in which parameter α represents the degree of income inequality aversion
among the poor. The headcount ratio, resp. poverty gap ratio, corresponds
to the FGT index with α equal to 0, resp. 1. We do not a priori restrict the
choice of the poverty index, even not to the class of FGT indices. However, as
we will show in Section 5, the axioms we will impose on the poverty measure
will lead us to prefer the headcount ratio.
Definition 1 A consumption-price-utility poverty measure, in short, a poverty
measure is a function P : S → R+ such that there exists an income construc-
tion function Y : S → RN+ , an income poverty line function y : S → RN+ and
an income poverty index Π : RN+ → R such that for all s = ((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) ∈
S,
P (s) = Π
(
Y (xi, pi, ui)
y(xi, pi, ui)
|i∈N
)
.
The first poverty measures we introduce are the ones that do not correct for
the heterogeneity in prices, and that define income thresholds with respect to
a common poverty bundle x. That is, they apply the income poverty index
to the ratio between agents’ actual incomes, or total expenditures, that is
Y (si) = pixi, and the money value of the poverty line bundle evaluated at
agents’ actual prices, that is y(si) = pix.
Definition 2 A price-sensitive poverty measure is a poverty measure P S :
S → R+ such that for all s = ((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) ∈ S,
P S(s) = Π
(
pixi
pix
|i∈N
)
.
The fundamental difficulty with price-sensitive poverty measures is that they
fail to measure poverty in a way that is consistent with agents’ preferences.
That is, it may be the case that poverty increases after a change in one poor
individual’s situation that makes her strictly better off. The following axiom
requires that this paradox be avoided.
Axiom 1 A poverty measure respects preferences if and only if for all s =
((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) , s′ = ((x′i, p′i, ui)|i∈N) ∈ S, if ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N
and uj(x′j) > uj(xj) for some j ∈ N such that Y (x′j, p′j, uj) < y(x′j, p′j, uj),
then P (s) ≥ P (s′).
Lemma 1 A price-sensitive poverty measure P S does not respect prefer-
ences.
This can be illustrated in Figure 1. Let us assume that (xi, pi) = (x′i, p′i) for
all agents i 6= j, and agent j faces price vector pj in one situation, consuming
xj, and p′j in another situation, consuming x′j. The two indifference curves
through those consumption bundles are drawn, and we can see that uj(x′j) >
uj(xj). We would expect poverty to be larger at xj, but it is not the case.
Indeed, prices are such that pjxj > pjx, so that agent j does even not qualify
as poor at xj, whereas she qualifies as poor at x′j, because p′jx′j < p′jx. By
property (2) of the income poverty index, P (s) < P (s′), in violation of what
the axiom requires.
4 Price-insensitive poverty measures
We now turn to price-insensitive poverty measures. The general idea consists
in transforming each individual situation into an equivalent income, which
Figure 1 A price-sensitive poverty measure does not respect preferences:
uj(x
′
j) > uj(xj), whereas P (xj, pj, uj) < P (x′j, p′j, uj).
-
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6
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0
  
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*
p′j
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does not depend on the actual prices but respects preferences. The typical
way of constructing equivalent incomes is by fixing some exogenous price
vector, p˜ ∈ P , and compute the income that, at price p˜, is sufficient to leave
the agent indifferent to her actual consumption. This is illustrated in Figure
2.
Figure 2 A price insensitive poverty measure: a common reference price
vector p˜ is used to compute equivalent incomes at x′1 and x′2 rather than at
x1 and x2.
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Formally, it corresponds to using the income construction function Y Ip˜ de-
fined by
Y Ip˜(xi, pi, ui) = ei(p˜, ui(xi)), (5)
where ei stands for the expenditure function, and an income poverty line
function
yIp˜(xi, pi, ui) = p˜x. (6)
That gives us the following poverty measures, indexed by a reference price
vector p˜.
Definition 3 Let p˜ ∈ P. A price-insensitive poverty measure indexed by p˜
is a poverty measure P Ip˜ : S → R+ such that for all s = ((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) ∈ S,
P Ip˜(s) = Π
(
ei(p˜, ui(xi))
p˜x
|i∈N
)
.
A price-insensitive poverty measure indexed by p˜ clearly respects preferences.
It is transparent from the fact that expenditure functions are themselves
numerical representations of preferences. Then, properties (2), (3) and (4)
guarantee that an increase in an agent’s utility cannot increase poverty.
The question that now arises is the one of the choice of p˜. As proven by Black-
orby and Donaldson (1988), different price vectors lead to different poverty
measures. The resulting poverty measures face a problem of arbitrariness,
which does not seem to have received satisfactory solutions.
We propose to solve the arbitrariness problem by dropping the idea that the
reference price should be the same for all agents. What is key for a poverty
measure to respect preferences is that the price vector is independent of the
actual prices. It is not necessary, though, to compute equivalent incomes by
using the same reference price vector for all agents.
Definition 4 Let p˜i ∈ P for each i ∈ N . A price-insensitive poverty mea-
sure indexed by individualized p˜i is a poverty measure P Ip˜i : S → R+ such
that for all s = ((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) ∈ S,
P Ip˜i(s) = Π
(
ei(p˜i, ui(xi))
p˜ix
|i∈N
)
.
Price-insensitive poverty measures indexed by individualized p˜i clearly re-
spect preferences. Now, the family of such measures is larger than the family
of price-insensitive poverty measures indexed by a unique price vector p˜. This
larger family, however, allows us to single out a poverty measure, by impos-
ing the following axiom. It requires consistency between income poverty and
preference poverty. An agent is income poor if the income poverty line y
is larger than her equivalent income, computed by using a reference price
vector. An agent is preference poor if she prefers the poverty line bundle x
to her actual consumption. The axiom is defined as follows.
Axiom 2 Consistency with Preference Poverty
For all s = ((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) , s′ = ((x′i, p′i, ui)|i∈N) ∈ S, for all j ∈ N ,
uj(xj) > uj(x
′
j) ≥ uj(x) ⇒ P (s) = P (s′) (7)
uj(xj) > uj(x) > uj(x
′
j) ⇒ P (s) < P (s′) (8)
uj(x) ≥ uj(xj) > uj(x′j) ⇒ P (s) ≤ P (s′). (9)
Many poverty measures satisfy this requirement, even if they are not price
insensitive. There is one and only one way for a price-insensitive poverty
measures indexed by individualized p˜i to satisfy it. It consists in defining the
individualized reference prices p˜i as proportional to agents’ marginal rates of
substitution at x. To put it differently, p˜i should be the price vector having
the property that x is agent i’s best bundle when agent i maximizes ui facing
prices p˜i with income p˜ix.
It gives us the following result.
Theorem 1 A price-insensitive poverty measure indexed by individualized
p˜i satisfies Consistency with Preferences Poverty if and only if all i ∈ N , p˜i
satisfies: for all xi ∈ X,
ui(x) ≥ ui(xi)⇔ p˜ix ≥ p˜ixi. (10)
Proof. 1) Let us prove that P satisfies Consistency with Preferences Poverty
if it is defined as in the statement of the theorem. By differentiability of the
ui’s on the interior of X, p˜i exists and is unique. Because ei(p˜i, u(·)) is a
numerical representation of the preferences,
ei(p˜i, ui(xi)) ≤ ei(p˜i, ui(x′i))⇔ ui(xi) ≤ ui(x′i).
Moreover, Eq. 10 guarantees that
ei(p˜i, ui(xi)) ≤ p˜ix⇔ ui(xi) ≤ ui(x).
Then, (7), (8) and (9) follow from (2), (3) and (4).
2) Let us now prove that if P , a price-insensitive poverty measure indexed
by individualized p˜i, satisfies Consistency with Preferences Poverty then
p˜i satisfies Eq. 10. Assume not. Then, for some i ∈ N , some ui ∈ U ,
ei(p˜i, ui(x)) < p˜ix. Therefore, there exists x∗i such that ei(p˜i, ui(x∗i )) <
p˜ix whereas ui(x∗i ) > ui(x). Let x∗∗i ∈ X satisfy ui(x∗∗i ) > ui(x∗i ) and
ei(p˜i, ui(x
∗∗
i )) > p˜ix. Let s, s′ ∈ S be such that sj = s′j for all j ∈ N \ i,
si = (x
∗
i , p
∗
i , ui) and si = (x∗∗i , p∗∗i , ui), where p∗i and p∗∗i are chosen so that
condition 1 of the model is satisfied. Because
ei(p˜i, ui(x
∗
i )) < p˜ix < ei(p˜i, ui(x
∗∗
i )),
by (3), P (s) > P (s′), whereas, the preference ranking
ui(x) < ui(x
∗
i ) < ui(x
∗∗
i )
implies that P (s) = P (s′), by (7), a contradiction.
Figure 3 Illustration of Theorem 1: agent i’s equivalent income at xi is
equal to p˜ix′i.
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In conclusion, the best way to have a poverty measure that respects pref-
erences and that avoids the arbitrariness of the choice of a reference price
vector consists in first choosing an income poverty measure, let us call it Π,
a poverty line bundle x, and then, for each agent i ∈ N , compute a price
vector p˜i that is proportional to the marginal rates of substitution at x, and
compute the poverty measure P II defined as:
P II (xi, pi, ui|i∈N) = Π (ei(p˜i, ui(xi))|i∈N) . (11)
5 Group-specific poverty lines?
Since the recent methodological change in the way of measuring poverty in
India, a debated question concerns the definition of the poverty line bundle.
It is argued that it should vary across groups, in oder to capture differ-
ent needs or consumption habits. It sounds like a competing way of facing
price variations and acknowledging heterogeneity of preferences. In this sec-
tion, we would like to compare it with our way to take price and preference
heterogeneity into account through price-insensitive poverty measures using
individualized reference price vectors.
Group-specific poverty lines are discussed by Mogstad et al. (2007) from a
different point of view. They acknowledge inter-regional price heterogene-
ity, but their objective is to measure relative poverty and the main reason
why they define specific poverty lines is because they consider that needs
depend on the level of consumption of the community to which individuals
belong. Taking account of the standard of living of that community calls
for specific poverty lines. We stick to the measurement of absolute poverty.
Therefore, we study specific poverty lines while keeping the proviso that the
income threshold should refer to some equivalent standard of living across
all individuals.
In order to address this issue, we need to give more structure to our eco-
nomic situations. We now assume that there is a set G of socio-demographic
groups (characterized by gender, age, etc.) and a set R of regions. The as-
sumptions are that all individuals belonging to the same group have the
same preferences, and all individuals living in the same region face the
same price vector. Therefore, we will refer to the situation of individ-
ual i ∈ N belonging to group g(i) ∈ G and living in region r(i) ∈ R as
si = (xi, pi, ui) = (xi, pr(i), ug(i)) ∈ Si.
We study the consequence of assuming that for all group g ∈ G and region
r ∈ R, there exists a specific poverty bundle xgr ∈ X. Compared to the
proposal that are currently debated, we add the possibility of making the
poverty line bundle depend on actual prices as well. As we will see below,
this will play a crucial role. The question we raise is the following: do price-
sensitive and/or price insensitive poverty measures with a common reference
price satisfy the axioms of Respect of Preferences and Consistency with Pref-
erences Poverty when the poverty lines are allowed to be group and/or region
specific? The theorem below states that the answer is yes, provided these
poverty lines bundles are defined in a very precise way. Moreover, in the case
of price sensitive poverty measures, poverty measures are required to use the
headcount ratio poverty index in order to satisfy the axioms. Indeed, by not
making the measure sensitive to increases in preference satisfaction below
the poverty line, the headcount ratio is the only way for a price sensitive
measure to guarantee that poverty conclusions will not go against individual
satisfaction.
We first need to redefine our poverty measures to allow the poverty line to
be group and/or region specific.
Definition 5 A group specific poverty line price-insensitive poverty measure
indexed by p˜ is a poverty measure P gIp˜ : S → R+ such that for all s =
((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) ∈ S,
P gIp˜(s) = Π
(
ei(p˜, ui(xi))
p˜xg(i)
|i∈N
)
.
Note that this definition does not impose any restriction on the way the xg
are chosen, g ∈ G.
Definition 6 A group/region specific poverty line price-sensitive poverty
measure is a poverty measure P grS : S → R+ such that for all s = ((xi, pi, ui)|i∈N) ∈
S,
P grS(s) = Π
(
pixi
pixg(i)r(i)
|i∈N
)
.
Again, this definition does not impose any restriction on the way the xgr are
chosen, g ∈ G.
We now state and prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 a) A group specific poverty line price-insensitive poverty mea-
sure indexed by p˜ P gIp˜ satisfies Consistency with Preferences Poverty if and
only if for all i ∈ N ,
xg(i) = arg max
p˜x≤p˜xg(i)
ui(x). (12)
b) A group/region specific poverty line price-sensitive poverty measure P grS
Respects Preferences and satisfies Consistency with Preferences Poverty if
and only if
• for all g ∈ G and r, r′ ∈ R,
ug(xgr) = ug(xgr′) (13)
• for all i ∈ N ,
xg(i)r(i) = arg max
pr(i)x≤pr(i)xg(i)r(i)
ug(i)(x) (14)
and
• Π is the headcount ratio.
Before we prove the theorem, we need to insist again on the degree of freedom
that is left in the definition of the group and group/region specific poverty
line bundles. If we apply P gIp˜, then the axiom is satisfied for all xg satisfying
Eq. 12 so that no restriction is imposed on the relationship between the
different xg, g ∈ G. If we apply P grS, on the other hand, the choice of the
poverty line bundles is constrained within each group g ∈ G according to Eq.
13, but, again, no restriction is imposed across groups.
Proof. The proof of statement a) is straightforward. It is illustrated in Fig.
4. If for all g ∈ G, the group specific poverty lines xg are chosen so that Eq.
12 is satisfied, as illustrated in the figure in the case of two groups, then for
any xg ∈ X, we have e(p˜, ug(x)) ≤ p˜xg if and only if ug(x) ≤ ug(xg) and the
axiom follows.
Let us prove statement b) in two steps. First, the necessity of Eq. 13 and 14
is clear and similar to the necessity of Eq. 12. It is illustrated in Fig. 5 in the
case of two groups and two regions. The difficult part consists in proving that
Π needs to be the Headcount ratio. This is illustrated in Fig. 6. The figure
Figure 4 A price insensitive poverty measure with a common reference price
vector p˜ and group specific poverty lines satisfies Consistency with Prefer-
ences Poverty for appropriately chosen poverty line bundles.
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Figure 5 The construction of group/region specific poverty lines necessary
for a price-sensitive poverty measure to Respect Preferences and satisfy Con-
sistency with Preferences Poverty.
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illustrates two individual economic situations, (xgr, pr, ug) and (xgr′ , pr′ , ug),
where ug represents preferences that are not homothetic. We need to think
of these preferences as non-homothetic in any non-empty open subset of X.
By construction, prxgr
prxgr
=
pr′xgr′
pr′xgr′
, so that, by definition, any P grS will conclude
that poverty is the same at the two situations. However, ug(xgr) 6= ug(xgr′).
Consider situation (x′gr, pr, ug). We have ug(x′gr) = ug(xgr′). As a conse-
quence, if P grS is to Respect Preferences, poverty needs to be the same at
(x′gr, pr, ug) and (xgr′ , pr′ , ug), so that, by transitivity, poverty needs to be the
same at (xgr, pr, ug) and (x′gr, pr, ug). We can derive the same requirements
by making xgr and x′gr vary from (0, . . . , 0) to xgr. That amounts to requiring
that poverty be independent of the utility of the agents below the poverty
line, which is exactly what the Headcount ratio and only the Headcount ratio
guarantees.
Figure 6 The preferences represented by ug are not homothetic. As a result,
we have ug(xgr) 6= ug(xgr′) whereas prxgrprxgr =
pr′xgr′
pr′xgr′
.
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In conclusion, we report in Table 1 the extent to which the different possible
approaches satisfy the two axioms of Respect for Preferences and Consistency
with Preferences Poverty as a function of whether the poverty line bundles
are allowed to depend on the groups or the regions.
Before we switch to the application, we need to fix the group and group/region
specific poverty line bundles. Our strategy will be to choose them in a way
that minimizes the difference among the resulting poverty measures. Any re-
maining difference will underline the consequences of choosing one approach
or another.
Let us assume that a global poverty line bundle x is given. This is the current
situation. First, if the xg are chosen such that
ug(xg) = ug(x),∀ g ∈ G,
and if the xgr are chosen such that
ug(xgr) = ug(x),∀ g ∈ G,∀ r ∈ R,
then it is routine to check that P gIp˜ = P grS = P Ip˜i , provided Π is the head-
count ratio.4 This comes from the fact that the combination of Consistency
with Preferences Poverty and the headcount ratio clearly leads to a unique
way of measuring poverty when the poverty line bundles are chosen to be
indifferent to a common x: the poverty measure should be equal to the frac-
tion of people who prefer x over their actual bundle. This is the approach we
favor. At the risk of stressing something obvious, we may mention that the
role played by incomes and income measurement is minimal in this approach.
Observing the bundles individuals consume and their preferences become the
only necessary ingredients to compute poverty. Of course, preferences are not
observable and need to be estimated. In the following sections we will use
demand systems to estimate preferences, and that will be the only role prices
and incomes will play.
There are two other approaches to the measurement of income poverty. The
second approach consists in applying a price-insensitive poverty measure with
a common poverty line. The resulting measure Respects Preferences but does
4If Π is not the headcount ratio, then P gIp˜ 6= P grS 6= P Ip˜i 6= P gIp˜, in spite of the fact
that both P Ip˜i and P gIp˜ Respect Preferences.
not satisfy Consistency with Preferences Poverty. Moreover, it faces the ar-
bitrariness of the choice of the reference price vector. The third approach
consists of applying the price-sensitive poverty measure, which does not sat-
isfy any of the axioms. In the application we develop in the next sections,
we compare these three approaches. In order to make them as close to each
other as possible, we adopt the headcount ratio. Our strategy then consists
in comparing the sub-populations that are identified as poor according to the
three approaches.
Table 1 Ability of the poverty measures to satisfy the axioms,
as a function of the nature of the poverty line bundle
Resp.
of
Pref.
Cons.
w/
Well-Being
P Ip˜i , with x + +
P Ip˜, with x + -
P Ip˜, with xg + +
P S, with x - -
P S, with xrg + if Π is the HC + if Π is the HC
6 Description of the data
We compare the three approaches by applying them to Indian data from the
61th(2004-05) round of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) conducted
by the National Sample Survey Organization(NSSO) of India. This is the
same survey used by the Indian government to obtain the official poverty
estimates. The dataset contains household level consumption (quantity and
expenditure) data on a vast variety of goods. In addition to these, the dataset
contains demographic information like age, gender, religion. The total sample
size is 100,855 households. Given that we observe consumption only at the
household level, we will be treating the household as a unitary unit and
referring to it as an individual. We compare households of similar household
composition and size by restricting our sample to households with three to
five members.
As we are concerned with measuring income poverty and following the offi-
cial Indian methodology, we focus on a basket of marketable goods containing
both food and non-food dimensions.5 Our basket contains - cereals, vegeta-
bles, fuel, and clothing.6 In our subsample, the total expenditure on these
four goods is 45% of the total expenditure on all goods (often used as a
proxy for total income). To ensure a clean and meaningful dataset we drop
households with total expenditure on the four goods in the 1-percentile and
99-percentile, households with no cooking arrangement at home, and those
with the household head eating-out for more than 60 meals a month.
As before, xi and pi denote the consumption and price vector respectively for
agent i ∈ N . In the data we observe the quantities consumed and expenditure
made on each item, where an item is the most disaggregate level at which we
observe data, for example the good of cereal is composed of items like rice,
wheat, maize, barley etc. The quantity consumed of a good is the sum of
consumption in all the items that compose the good. For each agent i ∈ N
and good ` ∈ I, we let xi` denote agent i’s consumption in good ` given by
xi` =
∑
m∈M`
x`im
where m ∈M ` denotes the items that compose good ` and x`im the quantity
consumed of item m by agent i. In addition to consumption, we also observe
the expenditure at the item level which we denote by y`im. The sum of these
expenditures gives us the expenditure on each good which in turn is summed
to give the total expenditure and is denoted by yi ∈ R+.
Information for cereal, vegetable and fuel is reported for 30-days recall period
giving us monthly expenditures. For clothing two recall periods are reported,
30-days and 365-days. We use the 365-days (adjusted to monthly) as longer
recall-periods are argued to be more reliable for durable goods. Clothing
includes bedding and footwear. We exclude second-hand items. As our
basket consists of aggregated, essential goods we observe very low rates,
i.e., less than 5%, of zero consumption for each of the four goods. Home-
production and items supplied by the public-distribution-system (PDS) are
5These being the ones for which we can calculate regional level prices. This rules out
goods and services like health, transport, rent.
6Fuel constitute a significant share of household expenditure in India and consists of
items such as firewood, electricity, kerosene, coal.
relevant for cereal and fuel consumption.7 We assume that consumption from
either of these sources reveals a preference for the good and hence evaluate
them at the constructed market price. In cases of only home-production or
PDS consumption for an item we construct and use the home-production
or PDS price respectively. For agent i we let wi denote the budget share
vector that is defined as the total expenditure on a good divided by the total
expenditure on the four goods.
Table 2 Budget Shares
Cereal Vegetable Clothing Fuel
Mean budget share 0.29 0.13 0.15 0.42
For the identification of preferences, price variation is key. We exploit the
price variation across the 70 regions of India, where a region is the rural
or urban sector of each of the 35 states. As before all individuals living
in the same region face the same price vector and for individual i living in
region r(i) ∈ R the price vector is denoted by pr(i). To construct these price
vectors we follow the methodology proposed by Deaton and Dupriez (2011)
of calculating item level unit values and correcting them for potential quality
selection.8
Once we have the item level prices, we aggregate all items constituting a
good using the Stone index to form the good level price as:
pr(i)` =
∑
m∈M`
w`r(i)mlog(p
`
r(i)m)
where w`r(i)m is the mean budget shares of item m in the individual’s region
and p`r(i)m the price of item m. The figure below shows the substantial price
7The PDS system provides a fixed quantity of rice, wheat, kerosene and sugar at
subsidized prices.
8 The methodology involves constructing the unit value of each item by diving the
expenditure by the quantity of the item. However, unit values cannot be treated as prices
as they could reflect quality effects when there are different varieties of the same item
available on the market at different prices. To correct for this, the methodology uses
individual level regression of the unit value on the total income (in this case the total
expenditure on all goods in the survey) and a regional dummy. Then one evaluates the
predicted value at the mean national total income to give the price of item m denoted by
p`r(i)m.
variation across the different states of India for the three goods in our basket
relative to the price of cereal.
Figure 7 Relative prices (wrt cereal) across India
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The second element key to our methodology is preferences. Given that we
assume that all individuals in the same group have the same preferences,
we choose the groups such that the assumption is likely to be valid while
offering sufficient between group heterogeneity in preferences. We use sector
(rural/urban) and age of household head (young/old) to create four prefer-
ence groups, where young (old) is defined as those below (above) the age of
50. Our sample is well distributed across the four groups, as shown in the
table below, allowing the estimation of preferences by group.
Table 3 Sample Size
Full Young-Rural Young-Urban Old-Rural Old-Urban
59,421 26,558 16,260 9,998 6,605
Finally, we fix the poverty line bundle, x, following the procedure of Ran-
garajan (2014). The aim is not to reproduce the poverty line but to allow
for comparison of different approaches to poverty measurement, one of them
being the one followed by the Indian government right now. Our food dimen-
sion consists of cereal and vegetables for which we take the average monthly
expenditure in the fifth quantile (20-25%) of the income distribution and cal-
culate the quantity consumed at average prices. The quantity consumed of
the non-food goods fuel and clothing at the tenth quantile (45-50%) is used
to form the non-food dimension of the poverty bundle. This gives us one
all-India national level poverty bundle as,
Table 4 Poverty bundle
Cereal Vegetable Clothing Fuel
Quantity of good 40 17 6 144
7 Estimation of the preferences
Given the detailed self-reported consumption data and regional price varia-
tion available to us, estimating group level preference using demand systems
is the most attractive method. It must be noted that such consumption data
is readily available for numerous countries making our methodology feasible
to implement. We use the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) introduced
by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) which gives for agent i belonging to group
g the budget share of good ` as :
w`ig = α
`
ig +
∑
k∈I
γ`kig log(p
k
r(i)) + β
`
iglog
[
yig
a(p)
]
, ` ∈ I
where α, β, γ are the parameters to be estimated, y is the total expenditure
on all the goods in the system, pk the price of good k, and a(p) is the price
index given by
log(a(p)) = α0 +
∑
k∈I
αklog(pkr(i)) +
1
2
∑
`∈I
∑
k∈I
γ`kig log(p
`
r(i))log(p
k
r(i))
We estimate this system separately for each of the four groups to obtain
heterogeneous preference parameters. The AIDS is an attractive demand
system for us as it accounts for cross price elasticities and satisfies properties
like homogeneity of degree zero in p and y, slutsky symmetry, and adding up.
One property that is does not guarantee is that of negative-semi-definiteness
of the Slutsky matrix. However, this property is crucial for our methodology
as we evaluate the marginal rate of substitution at specific bundles. We
use the method proposed by Moschini (1998) and Ryan and Wales (1998)
to add constraints on the AIDS to impose negative-semi-definiteness at a
specific point. This method is grounded in the fact that a negative-semi-
definite matrix can be expressed as the product of a diagonal matrix and it’s
transpose. Elements of this matrix are denoted by τ `k. As we will evaluate
the marginal rate of substitution at the poverty bundle, we choose this point
to be such that prices are normalized by their geometric mean and income
by the expenditure needed to consume the poverty bundle, x, facing the
geometric mean prices. We set α0 to be zero as suggested by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980).
Few transformations gives us the following system that satisfies all the con-
strains of the usual AIDS system. The cross price elasticity parameter γ is
deduced from the τ parameter.
w`ig = α
`
ig + α
`
iglog(
p`r(i)
Pα
)−
∑
k∈I
τ `klog(P kτ ) + β
`
iglog
yig
P
, ` ∈ I
where the aggregation functions, P kτ and Pα, and the price index, P , are
given by specific formulas. We follow the recommendation of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) to use the Stone index as an approximation of the price
index.
To tackle the issue of autocorrelation between the demand equations, re-
searchers use the technique of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estima-
tion. Here as we have a non-linear system, we use the nonlinear seemingly
unrelated regression (NLSUR) (see, for example, Poi (2008)). NLSUR fits a
system of nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions by using iterated feasible
generalized least squares (FGNLS) in the background. This is a maximum
likelihood estimator for large enough sample.
In Table 5 we present the estimates of the parameters α, β, and, τ for each
group. We find that most parameters are precisely estimated and they are
often significantly different between the groups.
8 Results
In this section, we apply the three different poverty measurement approaches
discussed in this paper to our data and compare who is identified as poor.
In order to do so we first develop the next steps in our methodology.9 Once
we have estimated the preference parameters and fixed the poverty bundle,
we can use these to solve for the reference price vector for each group. The
reference price is the price faced by the individual of a group such that her
demand is exactly the poverty bundle, x, given her preferences. For agent i
belonging to group g(i) ∈ G and living in region r(i) ∈ R, let the demand
function be denoted by xi(pr(i), yi), then we should have
xi(p˜g(i), xp˜g(i)) = x
where p˜g(i) is the reference price vector of group g ∈ G.
The Indirect Utility function for AIDS is given by:
v(p, y) =
ln(y)− ln(a(p))
b(p)
where a(p) and b(p) are given by,
log(a(p)) = α0 +
∑
`∈I
α`log(p`) +
1
2
∑
`∈I
∑
k∈I
γk`log(pk)log(p`)
and
b(p) =
∏
`∈I
p`
β`
For each good ` the demand can be derived from the indirect utility function
using Roy’s identity as:
9Note that the first approach can be implemented using the three different methodolo-
gies detailed in the sections before. However they all amount to computing the fraction of
population preferring the poverty bundle to their actual bundle and should give the exact
same poverty outcome. Hence, we detail the implementation only of the first methodology.
Table 5 Demand System Parameters
Young-Rural Young-Urban Old-Rural Old-Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α1 0.296*** 0.270*** 0.300*** 0.270***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
α2 0.120*** 0.146*** 0.120*** 0.145***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
α3 0.153*** 0.173*** 0.141*** 0.162***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
β1 -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.156*** -0.152***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
β2 -0.048*** -0.033*** -0.043*** -0.035***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
β3 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.073*** 0.104***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
τ11 0.180*** 0.203*** 0.179*** 0.210***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
τ12 0.001 0.051*** -0.006 0.054***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
τ13 -0.031*** -0.071*** -0.016*** -0.061***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
τ22 0.288*** 0.307*** 0.277*** 0.326***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
τ23 -0.221*** -0.079*** -0.205*** -0.033**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016)
τ33 0.371*** 0.501*** 0.317*** 0.474***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.012)
Observations 26558 16260 9998 6605
Notes: Cereal is represented by the index 1, Vegetable by 2, and Clothing by 3. The sig-
nificance levels are as: * significant at 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
x`(p, y) =
y(α` +
∑
k∈I γ
`klnpk + βm [ln(y)− ln(a(p))]
p`
For each of the four groups, we numerically solve a system of four equations
(one for each good) to give us the reference price vector, p˜g(i), for the group.
As evident in the table below, the estimated reference price vectors (relative
to the reference price of fuel) vary between the four groups.
Table 6 Reference Price
Young-Rural Young-Urban Old-Rural Old-Urban
Cereal 3.06 2.04 3.53 1.93
Vegetable 0.99 0.74 1.11 0.81
Clothing 1.30 1.11 1.63 1.28
Fuel 1 1 1 1
Finally, we evaluate the equivalent income such that the agent is indifferent
between her actual situation and facing the reference price. We evaluate it
for each agent using the equality of the indirect utility function,
vi(pr(i), yi) = vi(p˜g(i), ei(p˜g(i), ug(i)(xi)))
Using the indirect utility function formula for AIDS, we have:
log(ei(p˜g(i), ug(i)(xi))) = log(a(p˜g(i))) +
b(p˜g(i))(log(yi)− log(a(pr(i))))
b(pr(i))
Similarly, we evaluate the equivalent income at the common reference price,
p˜, denoted by ei(p˜, ug(i)(xi)). We pick the mean national price vector as the
exogenous common reference price.
Now, we have all the ingredients to compare the different poverty measure-
ment approaches discussed in Table 1. The poverty measure definitions 2, 4,
5, 6 are used with the poverty index as the headcount index, P0, to allow for
comparison. Let I(.) denote an indicator function and N the total sample
size then the poverty measures we will evaluate are given by,
P Ip˜i0 (s) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(ei(p˜g(i), ug(i)(xi)) < p˜g(i)x)
P Ip˜0 (s) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(ei(p˜, ug(i)(xi)) < p˜x)
P S0 (s) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(pr(i)xi < pr(i)x)
In addition to the headcount index, we also analyze the TIP curve which
is created by plotting the cumulated proportion of population on the x-axis
and the cumulated per capita poverty gap on the y-axis from the biggest
one downwards. The TIP curve provides more information on the poverty
rate than the headcount index as it captures the incidence, intensity, and
inequality of poverty. When a TIP curve dominates another one, all poverty
measures that are inequality averse among the poor conclude that poverty
is more severe in the former. We present the results by the three measures
for each group in Table 7 and Figure 8. We cannot directly compare our
results to the official poverty statistics, given the official poverty is evaluated
on a larger basket of goods and hence a different poverty bundle. However,
we can compare our approach to the price sensitive measure that evaluates
poverty as if the official methodology were applied to our poverty bundle.
Using our preferred approach of individualized reference prices, 57% of the
sample is identified as poor, with heterogeneity between the groups, i.e., 69%
are identified as poor in the Young-Urban group while 43% in the Old-Rural.
However, the main take away of our results is that using the different ap-
proaches leads to different poverty conclusions. The headcount index shows
large differences between the individualized and common reference price mea-
sures, with all groups having higher rates of 5-10% using the common refer-
ence price approach. The price sensitive approach yields smaller differences
when compared to our new measure. Thus we look at the TIP curves to
explore more than the headcount ratios. According to Theorem 2, looking
beyond the headcount ratio is justified on the ground of our price-insensitive
measure with individualized reference price but not on the price-sensitive
measure with regional and group specific poverty line bundles.
We find that the individualized reference price measure yields a different
poverty ordering of the groups than the other two approaches. Using these
two approaches, the TIP curve of Young-Rural is above Old-Urban imply-
ing more poverty in the Young-Rural group. On the contrary, our measure
identifies the curves of the Young-Rural and Old-Urban groups as almost
identical implying no poverty difference between the two groups. Second, we
find that the Old-Urban group (orange curve) is much more poor compared
to Old-Rural (green curve) by our measure than the other two. Similarly,
Young-Urban (red) is poorer than Young-Rural (blue). The height of the
TIP curves tell us that the intensity of the poverty gap is greater when using
the common reference price measure than our measure for all the four groups.
In conclusion, we find that the not taking preferences into account results in
systematically underestimating the share of the Urban in the poor population
as well as the poverty intensity within these groups. This is an indication
towards the two Urban groups suffering in the poverty evaluation by not
taking preferences into account or not taking preferences adequately into
account, i.e., the price-insensitive with common reference price does take
preferences into account but not the way our measure does.
The different conclusions that arise from the three approaches can poten-
tially come from differences in preferences or economic situation. To un-
derstand better how much of the differences between the groups come from
their different preferences compared to their economic situation, we do the
decomposition exercise detailed below and depicted in Table 8.
Table 7 Poverty Comparisons
Full Young-Rural Young-Urban Old-Rural Old-Urban
P Ip˜i , with x No. of poor 34,402 14,907 11,339 4,390 3,766
HC ratio 0.578 0.561 0.697 0.439 0.570
% of poor 1.00 0.433 0.329 0.127 0.109
P Ip˜, with x No. of poor 39,654 17,664 12,256 5,578 4,156
HC ratio 0.667 0.665 0.753 0.557 0.629
% of poor 1.00 0.445 0.309 0.140 0.104
P S, with x No. of poor 34,988 15,442 11,219 4,669 3,658
HC ratio 0.588 0.581 0.689 0.466 0.553
% of poor 1.00 0.441 0.320 0.133 0.104
Sample Size 59,421 26,558 16,260 9,998 6,605
Figure 8 TIP
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In Table 8, the columns tell us the price-insensitive individualized poverty
rate, keeping the economic situation of that group constant and varying the
preference across all the groups. Each row evaluates the poverty rate keep-
ing the preference of that group constant and varying the economic situation
across all the groups. The second cell of the first row, for instance, tells us
that Young-Rural would have a poverty rate of 65.94% if they were living
in the current conditions of the Young-Urban. In the columns we see what
would happen if each group had exactly the same economic situation, i.e.,
they would have the same poverty rates according to the price-sensitive ap-
proach but not according to our approach, indicating the effect of preferences.
Similarly, the rows tell us the affect of the economic situations.
Looking at the first column of the Young-Rural group, we see that in the
same economic situation, Young-Rural and Old-Urban preferences would give
a higher poverty rate for the Young-Rural group than 0.56. This implies
that not taking preferences into account would lead us to overestimate their
poverty. Column 3 for the Old-Rural group shows a similar pattern and tells
us that the Old-Rural group’s poverty is overestimated if preferences are not
taken into account. We see from the table that poverty of any urban group
is higher than that of any rural group, whatever the economic situation we
look at, that is, any of the first or the third row is dominated by any of the
second or fourth one. That strongly suggests that not taking preferences into
account leads to severely underestimating urban poverty.
Table 8 Price and Preference decomposition
Young-Rural Young-Urban Old-Rural Old-Urban
Young-Rural 0.5612 0.6594 0.4445 0.5218
Young-Urban 0.6028 0.6974 0.4879 0.5638
Old-Rural 0.5565 0.6592 0.4391 0.5228
Old-Urban 0.6224 0.7036 0.5090 0.5702
9 Conclusion
We propose in this paper an acceptable way to measure income poverty with-
out relying on arbitrary reference price selection while taking heterogeneous
preferences into account. The estimations that are needed to apply our ap-
proach, of course, are more demanding than what is required to apply the
classical price sensitive measures, but it is the same for any price insensitive
measure. Applying our method, we find that the not taking preferences into
account results in systematically underestimating urban poverty.
Our application suggests that taking preferences into account the way we do
it has serious consequences on the identification of the poor, and, therefore,
on the design and target of poverty policies. Our analysis, however, has
been limited to looking at preferences over four goods and partitioning the
population into four groups. Much more can be done and much more data
should be collected to make it possible to apply the method proposed in this
paper.
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